Duty III
Michael A. Gillette, Ph.D.

For the last couple of months in this newsletter I have been providing a rather theoretical discussion regarding the level of care for the disadvantaged that society must provide. I began by describing the libertarian view of Robert Nozick. In a nutshell, it is Nozick's contention that we contract into a society in order to create a level of security that we would not have if we each lived independently. The level of power that the state can rightly wield, therefore, is strictly limited to the level of power that is necessary to provide that security.

Rawls answered Nozick by arguing in an egalitarian way that we contract into a society in order to generate a series of goods that would not be available otherwise, and that the state is capable of using its power in any way that is consistent with the desires of rational contractors.

Rawls supports his argument by showing that an unbiased person who does not know what his or her specific situation is (because that knowledge would create bias) would rationally protect the underprivileged for fear that he or she might be one of them. Rawls would claim that the rich only prefer lower taxes because they know they are not poor. Knowing that they are rich, however, makes them biased. If they did not know whether they were rich or poor, they would choose to help the poor. The desire to help the poor is not biased (and therefore not unfair to the rich) because we don't have to know that we are poor in order to prefer helping the poor.

I believe that Rawls has the upper hand in this argument. One advantage for Rawls is that he does not have to discuss the knotty moral issues surrounding questions of desert. Many might argue, for instance, that the wealthy deserve their money and, therefore, have a right to keep it. But Rawls can avoid this argument. He can merely claim that desert-based claims are irrelevant, because even deserving people will rationally (when thinking in a fair and unbiased way) give up their wealth to help those who are less well off. Furthermore, Rawls can claim that no one really deserves much of what they have anyway. In order to work hard and make money, you need to be born with certain talents and must be raised in a way that encourages you to use those talents. You can hardly be said to deserve your IQ, so how can you deserve anything that comes from having that IQ?

Having left Rawls with the advantage in this argument, I feel compelled this month to allow Nozick a chance to respond.

Nozick claims that people can have just claims on certain things even if they don't deserve them in any deep sense. To show this, he argues along the following lines. Imagine that property is distributed in any way that you prefer. If you are Rawls then you will imagine that property is distributed such that the least advantaged are the best off that they can be. If you like, you may insist on strict equality. The initial distribution doesn't matter, so long as you are happy with it.

Now imagine that I am a great basketball player and I enter into an agreement with the owners of my team. I get them to agree that I should receive one dollar for each home team ticket sold. They find this arrangement suitable because I am a great box office draw. Each person who comes to a home game pays for his or her ticket by placing all of the money for the ticket minus one dollar in box A, and one dollar in box B that is marked "This is for Michael". Each fan knows how the money is being spent, and gladly puts one dollar in my box, because I am worth seeing.

At the end of the year I end up with a bonus to the tune of $500,000.00. This is above and beyond my normal pay, and much more than any other player receives. Is there anything wrong with the fact that I am now rich while basketball lovers have spent all of their money on seeing games?

Nozick argues that there can't possibly be any injustice here. We started with a perfectly fair distribution of money (it was your favorite) and each redistribution of money was perfectly voluntary and fair. If the end state is unfair, where did the injustice creep in? If the only fair distribution is the one with which we started, then the only way to preserve fairness is to prevent people from spending their money in the way they see fit. But surely that is an absurd conclusion.

Nozick's very strong argument shows that if we value freedom, we can't possibly stop people from making voluntary exchanges of money. If we can't stop people from making voluntary exchanges of money, then we can't prevent some people from getting rich while others get poor. If we can't prevent some people from getting rich while others get poor, then we can't tax the wealthy to take care of the poor. Rawls is in trouble.

Not only is Rawls in trouble, but so are the people in our society who can't afford their own healthcare and are not powerful enough, articulate enough or cute enough to get others to voluntarily help them. If Nozick wins this argument, then many of the people who are presently being treated in our State MH and MR facilities have no reasonable claim against society that they receive care for which they cannot pay.

I believe that there is a reasonable response to Nozick, however. Rawls argued that what is just is what a rational and unbiased person would decide. Nozick argued that Rawls' theory ignored the value of personal liberty. I argue that Nozick has over emphasized the value of personal liberty.

Both of these great philosophers begin with the same premise: that human beings contract out of a state of nature where radical freedom exists along side of insecurity, into a state of civil society where restrictions on freedom allow for cooperative living. What Nozick fails to see, I believe, is that liberty is not of absolute value. We give up some of our freedom by accepting the laws of society because it would be insane to demand perfect freedom if that entails anarchy. We limit our own freedom so that we might live together in mutual support. Mutual support is the goal of society and is definitive of civil living.

If our clients have any rights against us that we provide them with care when they cannot do so for themselves, that right is based on the simple claim that to provide such care is just plain 'civil'; it is simply what a society is in existence to do.