Evaluation of the Issues I
Michael A. Gillette, Ph.D.

Last month I described a series of technological procedures that make it possible to both replicate and manipulate the genetic package of an individual. I also outlined a series of ethical issues that can be raised in the discussion of genetic engineering. This month, I will begin the process of fully discussing each of the ethical approaches to the topic of genetic engineering.

In last month's Practical Ethics I indicated that four possible modes of argumentation can be utilized in the critique of cloning, genetic manipulation, and selective reproduction. The first two of those four types of arguments were based on claims that 1) genetic manipulation is contrary to nature or religious doctrine and is therefore wrong, and 2) genetic manipulation is scientifically dangerous. I will discuss these first two arguments this month.

Although I have great respect for the values that are communicated by a variety of religious traditions, I am prepared to argue that a prohibition on genetic manipulation on religious grounds is a poor basis for public policy. If we seek to prohibit or restrict genetic manipulation on the grounds that it is contrary to God's will, then we immediately run into two clear problems. First, given the vast array of distinct religious traditions, as well as the variety of interpretations within specific religious traditions, we will be hard pressed to find any uniformly accepted religious principle upon which to base our legal stand. There are too many people who believe in too many different theological views, or who do not believe in a religious view at all, to form a coherent public policy on the basis simply of religion.

In addition to the argument from religious variety, I would also maintain that the commitment within our political system to the freedom of religion would make any attempt to base laws solely on a religious foundation both dangerous and untenable. Notice, however, that I have spoken only to the possibility of basing a law on strictly religious grounds. It is possible that all religious views, and even some atheistic views, share certain fundamental principals in common. Perhaps a reliance on the values that are communicated through religion but which are not idiosyncratic is possible.

This shift in the argument compels us to recognize that the real force of a religious argument against genetic manipulation is based on the idea that there are some things in nature that it is improper for humans to change. Whether we are Christians, Hindus, Jews, or atheists, we might all agree that there is a natural order with which we must not tamper. The prohibition against genetic manipulation will then be based on the idea that humans would be overstepping their bounds by engaging in unnatural activity if they start to clone themselves.

While the argument from nature may have advantages over a strict argument from religion insofar as it does not force a particular religious view on individuals, it also fails. In order for the argument from nature to work, we must first determine that cloning is unnatural, and then we must determine that it is wrong to do things that are unnatural. Both of these tasks will prove difficult.

If we define cloning as unnatural because it involves the introduction of technological means to achieve an end that does not take place without technology, then flying in jet planes will also count as unnatural. If we accept this, then it becomes difficult to see how the fact that a technology is unnatural makes it immoral. The old argument that if God (or Nature) wanted us to clone then that would be how we normally reproduce, works just as well in the case of flying. If God (or Nature) wanted us to fly, then we would have wings. This argument is so unconvincing for most of us that the quest for frequent flyer miles continues unabated.

Once we recognize the force of the last argument, we are immediately forced to argue that flying is natural in a way that cloning is not. Driving a wedge between these two practices is difficult, however. We seem stuck with believing either that anything that we are capable of doing on the basis or our natural abilities is natural itself, or that an activity's being unnatural is morally irrelevant. In either event, we must find another reason to think that genetic manipulation is wrong.

The next move is to show that the reason that genetic manipulation is wrong is that it is imprudent. This argument is based on the view that if we start to alter our genetic package, we may unwittingly create new genetic defects, or destroy genetic advantages, and that the gene pool will be worse off for our efforts.

This argument is interesting, but more empirical than ethical. The most that this argument can show is that unwise use of technology is wrong, but that the use of technology is not wrong all by itself. Surely it is true that unwise use of technology is dangerous, but we must be careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water. If we reject every technology that could be misused, then no technology would be left to benefit our species. Should morphine be rejected because it can be supplied in an overdose?

What reason do we have for believing that this new technology will not be used appropriately? What assurance do we have that an official moratorium on the use of this technology will stop the evil minded from developing it anyway?

It seems to me that the more interesting arguments about cloning will revolve around the immoral actions that are associated with even the appropriate application of the technologies. Will harms accrue even if we use these techniques in effective and careful ways that are calculated to produce benefit? To answer those questions, we must look at the social implications of genetic manipulation next month.