Evaluation of the Issues II
Michael A. Gillette, Ph.D.

To conclude the discussion of genetic engineering and cloning that began two months ago in this newsletter, I must consider a final set of arguments that are based on social, not technological harms. These arguments break down into two classes; those that involve harms to people other than those cloned and those that involve harms to the clones themselves.

In the interest of space I will skip over some of the weaker versions and move directly to the strongest possible presentation of the social harms argument. The basic structure of these arguments rests on the view that by engaging in genetic engineering and cloning, we will alter our attitudes about the people whom we create by such means. We will also, it is argued, begin to generalize certain dangerous attitudes to others as well as those whom we have created.

The most basic rendition of this point of view is based on the idea that once we begin to micro-manage the characteristics of our children, we will begin to view them as objects of our creation, or consumer goods, rather than individual people with their own values and rights. In other words, if I genetically engineer a child to have certain talents (let us say an artistic ability), then I have a tendency to expect that the characteristic which I have instilled in that child will be exhibited. I will naturally expect my child to be artistic, and if my child fails to be artistic then I will complain that I was defrauded by the genetic engineering company that sold me its services. In an extreme case I might even attempt to return the faulty merchandise, claiming that I paid good money for an artistic child and I expect to get what I paid for.

This argument contends that genetic engineering will result in the "commodification" of our children. It will result in a shift in attitudes away from loving our children for their own sakes, toward loving them for some special characteristic that they possess and can use to our satisfaction.

The above outlined argument certainly sounds scary, but it makes three assumptions that may not be founded. First, it assumes that the behavior in question would be the result of genetic engineering and that it does not already exist in any prevalent way. Second, it assumes that genetic engineering will be used for non-therapeutic reasons (engineering out a genetic disease does not seem to commodify children any more than would the application of a medicinal aid). Third, it assumes that people will believe that genes are the ultimate determiner of characteristics, so that once a person is known to have certain genes, environmental influences on behavior can be ignored and prediction of future behavior can be made. Each of these assumptions can be questioned.

First, we can argue that while commodification of children surely is a bad thing, it happens already. Parents routinely apply pressure on their children to achieve so that parental prestige will increase. Second, therapeutic genetic engineering and screening can be applied in order to achieve goals for a child himself, such as eliminating painful diseases. Third, parents seem to know all too well that nurture plays a significant role in how children grow up to act. We can hope for the best genes in the world (and we do when we pick our mates based on characteristics that we find attractive), but without a solid upbringing we know that our children will have difficulties in realizing their potential. If these three counter arguments work, then do the social arguments against genetic engineering fail?

The ability to clone whole organisms -- like Dolly the sheep -- has pushed the world of genetic engineering to its limit, and creates the opportunity to reassert the argument from social harms. As argued in an excellent essay by philosopher Hans Jonas, we must be concerned that cloning robs an individual of his right to self-ignorance.

Jonas presents the intriguing point that as human beings, one of the most important conditions for our psychological well being is our ability to go through a process of self-discovery. As individuals we must find our own way, with some guidance, in developing our life plan and our world view. Not knowing where you will end up is necessary for the journey itself to have meaning, and that is precisely what we rob from our children when we clone ourselves. According to Jonas, our very freedom and independence rests on our ability to say that we are unique and that it is up to us, as individuals, to chart our own course. In order to do this, however, we must be somewhat ignorant about what lies ahead for us.

When we are clones, we lose our self-ignorance, lose the mystery of who we are as individuals, and lose the freedom to create our own characters. This is a serious harm to both the clones themselves, and to our self-image as human beings. It is an insult to what makes us uniquely human -- our autonomous nature.

If Jonas is correct, then the problem with cloning and genetic engineering is not that we will use it to harm people or that we will apply it for trivial ends. Rather, it is the assumption that we can create a person who will satisfy our goals. That person, then, is less free to fail us, and is just less free. This is a clever argument.

I cannot conclude this newsletter, however, by asserting that Jonas is right and that cloning and genetic engineering are wrong. I would surely use genetic tools to spare my child a serious illness (good use of technology). I can also see insurance companies using genetic information to screen for "pre-existing conditions” and then refuse to cover large numbers of people for diseases that they may never actually express (questionable use of technology). The best conclusion that I can draw at this point is that the practice of genetic control holds out fantastic hope as well as fantastic harm, and that this territory is perhaps best described as morally risky.