Seclusion & Restraint I
Michael A. Gillette, Ph.D.
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Recently, I was invited to provide an educational
session for a hospital regarding ethical issues in the
use of seclusion and restraint. As I began to prepare
for my presentation, I attempted to categorize the types
of cases involving seclusion and restraint according to
their ethical characteristics. This month I would like
to introduce some of the thoughts that I had on this
topic, and will in future months continue the discussion
with example cases in each of the specific moral
categories.
To begin, I claim that cases involving seclusion and
restraint fall into four distinct moral paradigms. The
four paradigms include cases in which the operative moral
concern surrounds direct harm to self, direct harm to
others, indirect harm to self and indirect harm to others.
Examples may help to elucidate these distinctions.
Direct Harm to Self: A good example of this sort of
situation involves a patient in a mental health institute
who persistently engages in self-injurious behavior such
as repetitive head-banging. Restraints might be used in
this situation to stop the patient from harming himself,
when such harm seems to be the direct result of the
patient's intended actions.
Direct Harm to Others: This type of problem is best
exemplified by a client who is violent toward others.
Imagine a patient who has been known to attack others. The
attacks may range in aggressiveness, but include hitting,
kicking and biting. The use of seclusion and restraint in
these sorts of cases is based on a concern for the welfare
of individuals who may be harmed by the patient's
aggressive behavior.
Indirect Harm to Self: This case involves a client who
is harmful to herself, but in a less active manner. A
client at a geriatric center may continually fall out of
bed for instance. Staff are concerned that the elderly
patient will suffer fractures and other injuries as a
result of falling out of bed, and they desire to place the
client in restraints to avoid a fall. The restraints in
this situation may be mild, such as the use of bed rails,
but if they restrict the client's freedom of action then
they are likely to qualify as restraints and fall under
our present topic of discussion.
Indirect Harm to Others: This class of cases is the
most difficult to deal with conceptually. Like the harm to
others situation explained above, the primary motivator
for the use of restraints or seclusion is that other
clients will be harmed if a particular client is not
restrained. Unlike the previous case, however, the harm
involved here is much less direct and much more difficult
to attribute to a particular offending individual.
Imagine for instance a client with extreme Pica who
must be monitored around the clock in order to stop him
from ingesting dangerous materials. Further, imagine that
staffing is limited, and that in order to provide the
appropriate support for this client, care must be
withdrawn, or at least reduced, from other clients. Is it
fair that a larger number of other clients should suffer a
reduced quality of care because one client exhausts
available resources? Clearly others are harmed here, but
the harm seems indirect.
Now that the four moral paradigms of seclusion and
restraint have been mapped out, we must consider the two
distinct approaches that are applied to the four
paradigms. These two approaches are classified as issues
of distributive justice and issues of paternalism.
Distributive justice is the area of ethical inquiry
that revolves around inter-personal allocations of goods.
In society there are many social goods that are allocated
by a variety of means. Social goods include all things of
value ranging from obvious goods like food, clothing,
shelter and money to less obvious goods like prestige,
security, authority, freedom and self-esteem.
In considering distributive justice issues, the moral
values at stake surround the methods of allocation and
discrepancies in the size of personal shares of the
desired social goods. We cannot expect that all people
will, or should, have perfectly equal shares of all of the
social goods. The point of distributive justice is to
determine what a fair distribution of goods might be, even
when that distribution is not even.
The best example of distributive justice comes from the
classroom. Grades are goods of which we all want a healthy
share. Some of us will get A's, and some will get F's.
Most of us will probably get B's and C's. The question
from a distributive justice point of view is "What is the
fairest way to allocate grades in the classroom?" Should
effort be rewarded, or should good results generate the
best grades?
Similar questions can be asked regarding the above
outlined paradigms involving harm to others. When one
client threatens harm to others, either directly or
indirectly, it is necessary to determine who must pay the
price for that harm. The client could be protected from
restraint, but only at a cost of harm to others.
Alternatively, the others could be protected at a cost to
the original individual. In determining how to proceed,
competing claims to protection must be balanced, and thus
the question is one of distribution.
In cases involving harm to self, a different approach
is warranted. Unlike inter-personal disputes which are
understood in distributional terms, intra-personal
difficulties must be understood in terms of paternalism.
A paternalistic activity is one that is executed in a
way that restricts the freedom of a particular person, but
does so in order to benefit the subject of the
restriction. When I intervene to stop my child from
naively jumping off of the roof while thinking that a bed
sheet will act as a parachute, I do so for my child's own
good and no one else's. This second approach to seclusion
and restraint, the paternalistic approach, is involved in
cases where I act to stop a client from harming herself.
There are cases in which it seems clear that both
distributional and paternalistic interventions involving
seclusion or restraint are justified. There are also cases
where the justification is not so easy to establish. In
future months, we will examine the gray areas.
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